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Calls for Speculation: An Experimental
Examination of Juror Perceptions of
Attorney Objections
KRYSTIA REED†
ABSTRACT
Should attorneys object during trial? Does preserving the record
outweigh the potential costs of objections, such as upsetting the jury
or drawing attention to the evidence? Legal scholars have opined on
the delicate balance attorneys must strike in their decisions to
object, but researchers have offered little to guide attorneys making
these in-the-moment decisions. I discuss results from two empirical
studies that provide evidence that attorneys have less to fear from
objections than legal scholars suggest. Based on these results, I
provide suggestions for practicing attorneys.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are defending a client in a criminal trial.
While examining one of the witnesses, the prosecution brings
up evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal record. The
defendant is not on the stand, and the use of the evidence in
this context clearly violates the rules of evidence in your

† Krystia Reed, J.D., Ph.D. is a National Science Foundation Post-Doctoral
Associate at Cornell Law School. Preparation of this article was funded by
National Science Foundation grant SES-1536238: “Quantitative Judgments in
Law: Studies of Damage Award Decision Making” to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie
F. Reyna. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed
in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Science Foundation.
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jurisdiction.1 You also believe that this evidence is unfairly
prejudicial to your client. What do you do? Do you object? Do
you ask the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the
evidence? Or do you sit there and do nothing, fearing that
objecting would have its own negative consequences and
praying that the jurors were sleeping and did not hear the
evidence?
The decision is likely not straightforward. Your decision
probably takes into account a number of factors: the
likelihood the judge will sustain the objection; how the
objection will influence the jury’s perception of you, your
client, and the evidence; and preservation of the record and
your ability to appeal the case.2 In fact, some legal scholars
are concerned that trial attorneys are forced to decide
between objecting and losing at trial or not objecting and
losing on appeal.3 To further complicate the situation,
attorneys must make this decision immediately4 and with
very little guidance beyond legal folklore.5
In this Article, I report the results of two studies
empirically investigating the impact of objections on juror
verdicts, perceptions of the attorneys, and memory for

1. Evidence of the defendant’s character, including criminal history, is not
admissible to prove that the defendant acted in accordance with that character
in terms of the specific crime. FED. R. EVID. 404. Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) only apply in federal court, this review will focus on evidentiary
rules under the FRE for the sake of simplicity since many jurisdictions have
similar rules.
2. See infra Part I for a discussion of the costs and benefits of objecting; see
also Krystia Reed & Brian H. Bornstein, Objection! Psychological Perspectives on
Jurors’ Perceptions of In-Court Attorney Objections, 63 S.D. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2018).
3. Christine R. Davis, Striking a Balance to Win: Balancing the Need to Win
the Trial with the Need to Preserve the Record on Appeal, 81 FLA. B.J. 18, 21–22
(2007).
4. FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring timely objections at risk of waiver).
5. Beyond FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(B) and the general guidance offered by the
FRE or other statutes, attorneys are given no specific rules for objecting.
Attorneys may learn objection strategy during law school or another course (e.g.,
Continuing Legal Education courses), but mostly they must figure out when to
object based on their own experience or mentorship from other attorneys.
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evidence. In Part I, I introduce the research on the influence
of objections on jurors. In Part II, I briefly describe the study
methodologies, and report and interpret the results. Finally,
in Part III, I explore the implications of the results and
discuss why attorneys should be less fearful of objecting than
legal commentators may suggest.
I. OBJECTIONS
During trial, objections are the primary way in which an
attorney can enforce evidentiary rules; when an evidentiary
rule is violated, the opposing attorney can object and request
some form of redress.6 Attorneys can object to procedurebased violations or content-based violations,7 but both types
of objections must state the grounds for objection8 and must
be timely.9 Thus, rules of evidence may provide attorneys
with some guidance on when they can object, but attorneys
must decide whether (and when) they should object instanceby-instance during trial by balancing the costs against the
benefits.
A. Legal Cost-Benefit Balancing Act
There are many benefits to timely objections. One of the
6. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.3 (5th
ed. 2012).
7. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 3–5 for a discussion of the types of
objections.
8. The FRE require that attorneys state “the specific ground, unless it was
apparent from the context.” FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(B).
9. FED R. EVID. 103. The court is only permitted to take notice of untimely
objections, or claims of error not properly preserved, if there is “plain error
affecting a substantial right.” FED. R. EVID. 103(e); see also Glenn E. Bradford &
James R. Wyrsch, Making the Record in the Trial Court, 64 J. MO. B. 284, 284–
85, 288 (2008) (discussing the consequences of untimely). This typically results in
two opportunities for attorneys to object—during trial or before trial (i.e., through
a motion in limine). See Charles W. Gamble, The Motion in Limine: A Pretrial
Procedure that Has Come of Age, 33 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1981) (explaining motions
in limine are procedural mechanisms used before trial to prevent the opposing
party and witnesses from using prejudicial evidence). See Reed & Bornstein,
supra note 2, at 5, for a discussion of timing.
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most important benefits is that a sustained objection can
correct an error immediately. If the objection is sustained
before the evidence is introduced, attorneys can block the
jury from ever hearing the unfavorable inadmissible
evidence.10 If the objection is sustained after the evidence is
introduced, the attorney can request the jury be instructed
to disregard or limit the evidence.11 Alternatively, even if the
objection is overruled, a timely objection preserves the record
so the attorney can appeal the decision.12 In addition to these
well-known benefits, some scholars also argue that
objections present attorneys an additional opportunity to
make persuasive arguments that sway the jury.13
On the other hand, legal scholars also advise that
objecting can have serious consequences. One major concern
is that objecting can alienate the jury.14 Additionally,
10. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the court to exclude relevant evidence
if there is a risk of unfair prejudice); see also JOHN H. BLUME & EMILY C. PAAVOLA,
OBJECTION
HANDBOOK
2
(2008),
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
research/death-penalty-project/upload/objection-20handbook.pdf; Christopher C.
vanNatta & Timothy J. Cothrel, The Object of My Objection, 33 LITIG. 26, 28–29
(2006) (explaining when to object).
11. The typical remedy is a curative instruction or a judicial admonition to
the jury to disregard the evidence. Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror
Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A MetaAnalysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (2006). This outcome is far less desirable
than having the objection sustained prior to the evidence being discussed.
Research demonstrates that jurors are unable to completely disregard
inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so. Id. at 475, 486 (discussing the
results from a meta-analysis summarizing 48 studies on the topic).
12. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 21. Again, this result is often less ideal
than having the objection sustained prior to the evidence being discussed since
cases are rarely overturned on appeal. Statistics from 2015 indicate that 8.3% of
cases were reversed on appeal. TABLE B-5. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS—
DECISIONS IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF
PROCEEDING, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2015,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-5/judicial-business/2015/09/30
(last
visited Aug. 23, 2018). This is the highest rate since 2012. Reed & Bornstein,
supra note 2, at 7 n.47.
13. Edward D. Ohlbaum, Jacob’s Voice, Esau’s Hands: Evidence-Speak for
Trial Lawyers, 31 STETSON L. REV. 7, 9–10 (2001).
14. Davis, supra note 3, at 21–22; Steven Lubet, Objecting, 16 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 213, 219 (1992); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, at 9; Fred
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scholars opine that objecting can potentially draw more
attention to the evidence the attorney is attempting to
suppress.15 Both of these concerns are not insignificant;
however, little is known about their validity.
B. The Psychology of Objecting
The majority of psycholegal research on objections
relates to inadmissible evidence. Generally, these studies
focus on one piece of critical testimony that is challenged as
inadmissible.16 Researchers compare juror perceptions in
three situations: critical testimony that is objected to and
admitted (admit); critical testimony that is objected to and
ruled inadmissible (disregard); and no critical testimony or
objections (control).17 Results indicate that jurors are unable
to disregard evidence completely; jurors in the disregard
condition rely on the critical testimony significantly less than
jurors in the admit condition, but significantly more than
jurors in the control condition who never heard the
testimony.18 Moreover, research indicates that in some
instances, judicial instructions to disregard evidence can
even backfire and result in jurors relying more on the critical
testimony.19
Warren Bennett, Preserving Issues for Appeal: How to Make a Record at Trial, 18
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 87 (1994).
15. Steblay et al., supra note 11, at 487. But see Molly Juliann Walker Wilson,
Objecting to Objections: The Paradoxical Consequences of Courtroom
Interruptions, 53 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia) (on file with author).
16. See Steblay et al., supra note 11, for a meta-analysis summarizing the
results of 48 of these types of studies.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. For example, mock jurors instructed to disregard evidence about a
defendant’s prior conviction rendered more guilty verdicts than mock jurors who
heard the information without an instruction. Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 407, 407 (1995). See also Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, Effects of
Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules
of Admissibility, 4 SOC. BEHAV. 31, 31 (1989); Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial
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Thus, the primary focus of these studies is the critical
testimony—objections are only used as a mechanism for
manipulating the admissibility of the critical testimony.
Only one study by Wilson includes a fourth condition of
critical testimony admitted without an objection,20 and none
of the studies include a fifth condition of objection without
critical testimony. Findings from Wilson’s study indicate
that the objections are important—participants were
significantly more likely to render a guilty verdict when
critical testimony is ruled admissible following an objection
than when it is ruled inadmissible at the end of the trial with
no objection.21 Therefore, the current understanding of how
objections influence jurors is virtually inseparable from our
understanding of inadmissible evidence, even though they
are very different conceptually.
Although there is little empirical research directly
investigating objections, there is general psychological
research that can aid in our predictions. Objections could

Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 430
(1990); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The
Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 SOC.
BEHAV. 165, 165 (1987); Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the
Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205, 206–09 (1977).
This is concerning because the goal of limiting instructions is to cure any
prejudicial impact of questionable evidence by encouraging jurors to limit the use
of certain evidence to admissible purposes or to completely disregard
inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299–303 (1981)
(discussing that limiting instructions might not be a sufficient safeguard in
practice). Some research indicates that limiting instructions can be effective. See
generally W. R. Cornish & A. P. Sealy, L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules
of Evidence, CRIM. L. REV. 208 (1973); Rita James Simon, Murder, Juries, and the
Press, 3 TRANS-ACTION 40 (1966). However, the majority of research indicates that
limiting instructions are ineffective. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt,
Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological
Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and
Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL., & L. 677 (2000) (explaining
the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions).
20. Wilson, supra note 15, at 3.
21. Id.
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influence jurors through many psychological routes.22 For
the purpose of these studies, I will focus on how interruptions
and attributions influence memory for evidence and
perceptions of attorneys, both of which can influence the
ultimate verdict.
1. Memory for evidence
Objections, by their nature, interrupt trial proceedings.23
When an attorney objects, it temporarily halts the trial and
disturbs the continuity of the other attorney or witness.24
Interruptions change how people allocate attention and
remember information;25 however, the effect is complicated
and depends on several factors. Some researchers have found
that interruptions increase attentional demands, 26 resulting
in information overload that increases confusion and
decreases memory.27 In other studies, researchers have
found that interruptions draw attention to stimuli and
22. For a more complete review of psychological factors that might explain the
impact of objections on jurors, see Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2.
23. Wilson, supra note 15, at 9; see also Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at
12–23. Interruption is defined as “incidents or occurrences that impede or
delay . . . progress on [a task].” Quintus R. Jett & Jennifer M. George, Work
Interrupted: A Closer Look at the Role of Interruptions in Organizational Life, 28
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 494, 494 (2003). Researchers have identified four types of
interruptions: intrusions, breaks, distractions, and discrepancies. Id. Objections
are most similar to intrusions, so that will be the focus of this section. Reed &
Bornstein, supra note 2, at 12–13.
24. An objection is “[t]he act of a party who objects to some matter or
proceeding in the course of a trial, or an argument or reason urged by him in
support of his contention that the matter or proceeding objected to is improper or
illegal. Used to call the court’s attention to improper evidence or procedure. Such
objections in open court are important so that such will appear on the record for
purposes of appeal.” Objection, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
25. Timo Mäntylä & Teresa Sgaramella, Interrupting Intentions: Zeigarniklike Effects in Prospective Memory, 60 PSYCHOL. RES. 192, 197 (1997).
26. Chris Eccleston & Geert Crombez, Pain Demands Attention: A CognitiveAffective Model of the Interruptive Function of Pain, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 356, 356
(1999); Seth Geiger & Byron Reeves, We Interrupt This Program . . . Attention for
Television Sequences, 19 HUM. COMM. RES. 368, 368 (1993).
27. James T. Milord & Raymond P. Perry, A Methodological Study of
Overload, 97 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 131, 131 (1977).
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improve memory.28 Other researchers suggest that attention
and memory only increase when the interruption is similar
in content to the interrupted material. 29 Yet, other
researchers find that interruptions are most memorable
when they are distinct, unusual, or stand out in some way. 30
Objections in a trial may also influence memory for
evidence beyond these basic effects of interruptions by
disrupting jurors’ story construction. Pennington and Hastie
28. See JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS
HAPPEN 5 (2009) (discussing task processing); Robert S. Baron, DistractionConflict Theory: Progress and Problems, 19 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 3–10 (1986) (discussing distraction-conflict theory); Jean-Marie
Cellier & Hélène Eyrolle, Interference Between Switched Tasks, 35 ERGONOMICS
25, 33–34 (1992) (discussing results of study assessing interruptions and task
accuracy); Noah Schiffman & Suzanne Greist-Bousquet, The Effect of Task
Interruption and Closure on Perceived Duration, 30 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC. 9,
9–10 (1992) (studying the effect of interruptions on problem-solving time).
29. See Mäntylä & Sgaramella, supra note 25, at 192–93 (explaining the study
in which researchers manipulated whether they interrupted a task with an
anagram activity, and when the task was interrupted, participants displayed
enhanced prospective memory performance). For example, distractors are less
likely to decrease memory for word pairs when the words are meaningfully
linked. James J. Jenkins, Remember that Old Theory of Memory? Well, Forget It!,
29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 785, 792 (1974); Norman J. Slamecka, Differentiation
Versus Unlearning of Verbal Associations, 71 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 822, 822
(1966).
30. Research on memory indicates that people have better memory for
unusual information than for common information, which is known as the
distinctiveness effect. See generally Alan D. Baddeley & Graham Hitch, The
Recency Effect: Implicit Learning with Explicit Retrieval?, 21 MEMORY &
COGNITION 146 (1993); R. Reed Hunt, The Concept of Distinctiveness in Memory
Research, in DISTINCTIVENESS AND MEMORY 3, 3 (R. Reed Hunt & James B.
Worthen eds., 2006); Larry L. Jacoby & Fergus I. M. Craik, Effects of Elaboration
of Processing at Encoding and Retrieval: Trace Distinctiveness and Recovery of
Initial Context, in LEVELS OF PROCESSING IN HUMAN MEMORY 1 (Laird S. Cermak
& Fergus I. M. Craik eds., 1979); Anjali Thapar & Robert L. Greene, Evidence
Against a Short-Term-Store Account of Long-Term Recency Effects, 21 MEMORY &
COGNITION 329 (1993); Paula J. Waddill & Mark A. McDaniel, Distinctiveness
Effects in Recall: Differential Processing or Privileged Retrieval?, 26 MEMORY &
COGNITION 108 (1998). But, distinctiveness is context-dependent. For example,
seeing a giraffe on a school campus might be very distinct and memorable, while
seeing the same giraffe in a zoo would be ordinary. Kathleen B. McDermott &
Henry L. Roediger III, Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval), in NOBA TEXTBOOK
SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY (R. Biswas-Diener & E. Diener eds., 2019),
http://nobaproject.com/modules/memory-encoding-storage-retrieval.
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developed the story model of jury decision-making that
explains jury decisions based on certain existing mental
concepts.31 The story model hypothesizes that “jurors impose
a narrative story organization on trial information, in which
causal and intentional relations between events are
central.”32 Attorneys and witnesses present evidence at trial
in pieces, which jurors, like mystery novel readers, must
then put together like a puzzle.33 Objections halt the
testimony and narrative, and can therefore alter the story
jurors construct.34
Thus, it is possible that objections do influence jurors’
memories of the evidence, but could do so in many ways.
Objections might overload jurors and decrease their memory
or direct jurors’ attention to the evidence like a spotlight and
increase their memory. Moreover, other factors might drive
the effect. If similarity is important, objections that are
similar in content to the testimony might increase memory,
while unrelated interruptions might decrease memory. If
distinctiveness is important, infrequent objections or
objections that are strange in content might be more
memorable than frequent or ordinary objections. Wilson’s
study on objections indirectly supports this distinctiveness
31. In psychology these existing mental concepts are known as schemas. See
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 243 (1986) [hereinafter
Pennington & Hastie I]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 192 (1992) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie II].
32. Pennington & Hastie I, supra note 31, at 243.
33. Id.
34. There is currently no research investigating how interruptions influence
story construction, but it is possible that objections can result in less complete
and less powerful stories. Story model research indicates that jurors are less
influenced by less complete stories. Pennington & Hastie II, supra note 31, at
202. On the other hand, research on story construction indicates that jurors will
fill-in-the-blanks following interruptions, suggesting that objections might not
have much impact on story construction, particularly if the testimony is not
completely barred. See id. at 197 (suggesting that if the testimony is barred and
the objection prevents delivery of some information, it could impact the
completeness of the narratives jurors develop).
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theory,35 but research has not empirically tested these
theories directly. The two studies I present in this paper
represent the first attempt at empirically testing these
theories directly.
2. Perceptions of attorneys
Although evidence tends to be the most influential factor
on verdicts,36 jurors’ perceptions of the people involved in the
case can also have an influence. For example, an attorney’s
gender,37 attractiveness,38 race,39 and personality40 all
influence verdicts beyond the evidence. Objections, therefore,
could influence verdicts by altering jurors’ perceptions of the
objecting attorney.

35. Wilson, supra note 15, at 3–4. The study focused on only one piece of
inadmissible testimony. In both conditions, jurors heard the same evidence and
were told to disregard it, but the instruction to disregard was either immediate
and preceded by an objection, or was delayed until the end of trial with no
objection during trial. Mock jurors were less able to disregard the evidence if
there was an immediate objection and instruction than if there was no objection
and a delayed instruction.
36. EDIE GREENE
289 (6th ed. 2007).

ET AL.,

WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY

AND THE

LEGAL SYSTEM

37. Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation
Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 533, 533 (1996); Mary Stewart Nelson, The Effect of Attorney Gender on
Jury Perception and Decision-Making, 28 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 177, 177 (2004);
Krystia Reed & Jennifer Groscup, Hot or Not? The Influence of Attorney
Attractiveness and Gender on Juror Decision Making 2 (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
38. Jansen Voss, The Science of Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and
the Science Behind the Art of Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.
301, 317 (2005); Reed & Groscup, supra note 37, at 2.
39. David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random
Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1145
(2007); Russ K. E. Espinoza & Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Defendant and Defense
Attorney Characteristics and Their Effects on Juror Decision Making and
Prejudice Against Mexican Americans, 14 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 364, 364 (2008).
40. Pamela Hobbs, ‘Is That What We’re Here About?’: A Lawyer’s Use of
Impression Management in a Closing Argument at Trial, 14 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y
273, 276–77 (2003).

2019]

CALLS FOR SPECULATION

63

Every day, people make judgments, or attributions,
about whether another person’s behavior is based upon their
personality or the situation.41 These attributions are often
automatic and biased.42 Although these attributions can be
helpful, in the courtroom, jurors’ attributions can be
prejudicial, and procedural evidentiary safeguards are
typically insufficient protections.43
Objections have the potential to influence several
attributions that will negatively influence perceptions of the
objecting attorney.44 For example, it is possible that
objections will make it appear as if the attorney is trying to
hide or distort information, which could result in jurors
making attributions about the attorney’s personality and
could potentially trigger existing stereotypes about attorneys
being corrupt, greedy tricksters.45 Alternatively, it is possible
that by objecting, jurors will determine that the objecting

41. There are several theoretical models describing how attributions are
made. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 24–28 for a review of attributions
and their relation to objections.
42. Humans typically are not rational actors and often rely on a single, quick
explanation rather than searching all evidence to find the best possible
explanation for a behavior. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL
COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 219 (Luke Block ed., Sage Publications 3d
ed. 2017) (2008).
43. Attributions about different trial participants, such as victims and
defendants, influence verdicts. There is a strong negative correlation between
victim blame and verdict. See generally Gloria J. Fischer, Effects of Drinking by
the Victim or Offender on Verdicts in a Simulated Trial of an Acquaintance Rape,
77 PSYCHOL. REP. 579 (1995); Yael Idisis et al., Attribution of Blame to Rape
Victims among Therapists and Non-Therapists, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 103 (2007);
B. J. Rye et al., The Case of the Guilty Victim: The Effects of Gender of Victim and
Gender of Perpetrator on Attributions of Blame and Responsibility, 54 SEX ROLES
639 (2006).
44. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 26–28 for a more complete
discussion of attributions about attorneys.
45. LEO J. SHAPIRO, A.B.A SEC. LITIG., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS
CONSUMER
RESEARCH
FINDINGS
(2002),
https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/public_perception_
of_lawyers_2002.authcheckdam.pdf; Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors’
Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L. J.
1297, 1327 (1993).
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attorney is verbally aggressive,46 triggering negative general
perceptions.47
Jurors’ attributions about objecting attorneys might vary
based on the attorneys’ gender. Society tends to have
different expectations for men than women;48 men are
expected to be more agentic, controlling, and independent,
while women are expected to be more communal, emotionally
expressive, and interpersonally sensitive.49 People who
violate these gender expectations typically suffer negative
backlash from others,50 including women who are perceived
as too masculine professionally.51 Furthermore, female
jurors who express the masculine characteristic of anger lose
credibility, while angry male jurors gain credibility. 52 If
objections are perceived as an assertive, masculine
characteristic,53 jurors might have more negative
perceptions of objecting female attorneys than objecting male
attorneys; if objections are perceived as a method of
46. Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 21–22.
47. Valerie Cryer Downs et al., The Impact of Argumentativeness and Verbal
Aggression on Communicator Image: The Exchange between George Bush and
Dan Rather, 54 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 99, 102 (1990); Dominic A. Infante & Charles
J. Wigley, Verbal Aggressiveness: An Interpersonal Model and Measure, 53 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 61, 61 (1986).
48. This is known as social role theory. ALICE H. EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION 7 (1987).
49. Id. at 9–10. See generally Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals
Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701 (2004);
Rosanna E. Guadagno & Robert B. Cialdini, Gender Differences in Impression
Management in Organizations: A Qualitative Review, 56 SEX ROLES 483 (2007).
50. Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs
and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (1998).
51. At work, women who are too agentic, dominant, self-promotional, or take
on a leadership role might suffer workplace discrimination. See, e.g., Susan T.
Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1050–51 (1991).
52. See generally Jessica M. Salenro & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, One Angry
Woman: Anger Expressions Increases Influence for Men but Decreases Influence
for Women, During Group Deliberation, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 581 (2015).
53. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 23–24.
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advocating for one’s client, jurors might have less negative
perceptions of objecting female attorneys than objecting male
attorneys.54 Thus, I designed the two studies presented
below specifically to assess whether objecting negatively
influences jurors’ perceptions of the attorneys, and whether
the effect varies based on attorney gender.
II. THE CURRENT STUDIES: THE EFFECT OF OBJECTIONS ON
MOCK JURORS
I conducted two studies that empirically test the validity
of concerns about objections negatively influencing jurors. In
both studies, mock jurors listened to an audio trial of an
armed robbery case. Some jurors heard the trial without
interruptions, while others heard it with interruptions or
objections. After listening to the trial, jurors rendered a
verdict, rated the attorneys, and answered questions about
their memory for the evidence. Given attorney concerns and
psychological research, I predicted that objections would
negatively influence mock juror verdicts, perceptions of the
attorneys, and memory for evidence.55
A. Study 1: Objections and Interruptions
The first study investigated whether objections are
psychologically similar to other interruptions during trial.
Two-hundred
and
sixty-two
mock
jurors
(132

54. See, e.g., Emily T. Amanatullah & Catherine H. Tinsley, Punishing
Female Negotiators for Asserting Too Much . . . or Not Enough: Exploring Why
Advocacy Moderates Backlash Against Assertive Female Negotiators, 120 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 110, 110 (2013) (finding no backlash against
women engaging in negotiation for others).
55. These studies only included defense attorney objections, so directional
hypotheses are based on the perspective of the defense attorney (i.e., negatively
influence = fewer not guilty verdicts, higher prosecuting attorney ratings, lower
defense attorney ratings, and better memory for evidence). For specific
hypotheses, see Krystia Reed, Trial, Interrupted: Juror Perceptions of Attorney
Objections (Dec. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of NebraskaLincoln) (on file with author).

66

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

undergraduates and 130 community members)56 listened to
the audio trial which varied the presence, type, and frequency
of the interruptions57 or objections.58
1. Presence of interruption/objection
Initially, I tested whether the mere presence of an
interruption mattered. Interruption presence influenced
verdicts; however, contrary to concerns, interruptions
resulted in more not guilty verdicts, which benefits the
defense attorney.59 The presence of an interruption had no
56. Undergraduate students (Mage = 19.5, 74.2% female, 78% white) were
recruited from the psychology department participant pool at a large Midwestern
university and were compensated with course credit. Community members
(Mage = 35.5, 35% female, 72% white) were recruited using TurkPrime and were
compensated with $6. TurkPrime is a research platform integrating Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with social science research methods. See Leb Litman
et al., TurkPrime.com: A Versatile Crowdsourcing Data Acquisition Platform for
the Behavioral Sciences, 49 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 433, 433 (2017) (reviewing
TurkPrime); see also Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A
New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality Data, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3
(2011) (reviewing MTurk); Kristin Firth et al., Law and Psychology Grows Up,
Goes Online, and Replicates, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 333–55 (2018) (for
a comparison of MTurk data to other community samples in psychology-law
research).
57. Legally-irrelevant interruptions included ringing cell phones (infrequent:
1; frequent: 2), church bells (infrequent & frequent: 1), construction noises
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 10), sneezing (infrequent & frequent: 1), and coughing
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 1). Each legally-irrelevant interruption was followed by
a judicial comment to parallel judicial comments following objections.
58. Objections included hearsay (infrequent: 2; frequent: 5), narrative
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 3), relevance (infrequent & frequent: 1), speculation
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 2), leading (infrequent: 0; frequent: 1), asked and
answered (infrequent: 0; frequent: 1), and argumentative (infrequent: 0;
frequent: 2). Each objection was followed by a judicial ruling (66% overruled, 33%
sustained), but because this was not a study of inadmissible evidence, the
evidence did not change based on judicial ruling, and the jury was never
instructed to disregard any evidence.
59. See infra Figure 1. See infra Table 1 for results of the hierarchical logistic
regression. Note, however, that there was an interaction between interruption
and sample. Overall, interruptions resulted in more not guilty verdicts, but the
pattern was different for students than community members. In the interruption
condition, students and community members voted not guilty at similar rates; in
the no interruption condition students voted not guilty less than in the
interruption condition while community members voted not guilty more than in
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effect on the ratings of either attorney.60 Mock jurors who
heard the interrupted trial also had better memory for
evidence presented after the interruption (“after
evidence”);61 there was no difference in memory for evidence
presented before the interruption (“before evidence”).62
Thus, the presence of the interruption did not influence
jurors overall. It made no difference in attorney ratings or
memory of after evidence. However, interruptions
inconsistently influenced verdicts based on the audience,
with interruptions resulting in better verdicts for the defense
attorney with student mock jurors, but worse with
community member mock jurors.

the interruption condition.
60. See infra Figure 2. The fourteen questions about each attorney were
combined into composite scores based on a factor analysis (consistent with Reed
& Groscup, supra note 37) to create 4 ratings with high reliability: prosecuting
attorney favorability (α = 0.88), prosecuting attorney aggressiveness (α = 0.75),
defense attorney favorability (α = 0.91), and defense attorney aggressiveness
(α = 0.77). There were no differences in any of the ratings based on interruption
presence: prosecuting attorney favorability, F(1, 214) = 0.17, MSe = 0.89, p = 0.68;
prosecuting attorney aggressiveness, F(1, 214) = 2.31, MSe = 1.99, p = 0.13;
defense attorney favorability, F(1, 214) = 0.03, MSe = 0.92, p = 0.87; defense
attorney aggressiveness, F(1, 214), MSe = 1.98, p = 0.37. Scores were measured on
7-points scales with 7 being higher in the trait.
61. See infra Figure 3. Created by averaging the scores on five questions about
evidence presented after the interruption (“after evidence”). F(1, 213) = 11.40,
MSe = 0.62, p = 0.001 (interruptions: M = 3.58, SD = 0.78; control: M = 3.13,
SD = 0.80).
62. See infra Figure 3. Created by averaging the scores on five questions about
evidence presented before the interruption (M = 3.95, SD = 0.91). There was no
difference based on interruption presence, F(1, 213) = 0.50, MSe = 0.82, p = 0.48,
R2 < 0.01.
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Percent not guilty verdicts by interruption
presence in Study 1.
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Memory for evidence based on interruption
presence in Study 1.

2. Type of interruption or objection
After identifying that the presence of an interruption
influenced jurors, next I tested whether the type of
interruption mattered—do objections influence jurors in the
same way as interruptions? Contrary to attorney concerns,
objections
did not influence verdicts,63 attorney
64
favorability, or memory for evidence65 any differently than
legally-irrelevant
interruptions.
Interestingly,
the
63. See infra Table 2 for results of the hierarchical logistic regression (not
guilty verdicts—objection: 68.6%; interruption: 65.9%).
64. Prosecuting attorney favorability, F(1, 150) = 0.00, MSe = 0.85, p = 0.99;
defense attorney favorability, F(1, 150) = 0.02, MSe = 1.97, p = 0.89.
65. Before evidence, F(1, 150) = 0.02, MSe = 0.79, p = 0.90 (percentage
correct—objection: 80.2%; interruption: 80.2%); after evidence, F(1,150) = 1.98,
MSe = 0.63, p = 0.16 (percentage correct—objection: 70.0%; interruption: 73.4%).
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prosecuting attorney (who did not object) was rated as
marginally more aggressive in the condition where the
defense attorney objected;66 however, ratings of the defense
attorney (who objected) aggressiveness were not different.67
FIGURE 4.

Attorney ratings based on interruption type in
Study 1.

Thus, objections are not operating substantially
differently from other interruptions. Mock juror verdicts,
ratings of the objecting attorney, and memory for the
evidence were not worse when the trial was interrupted with
an objection compared to a legally-irrelevant interruption. In
fact, when the defense attorney objected, the prosecuting

66. F(1, 150) = 3.44, MSe = 1.99, p = 0.07.
67. See infra Figure 4. F(1, 150) = 0.47, MSe = 2.01, p = 0.50.
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attorney was viewed as more aggressive.68 Objections did not
harm the objecting defense attorney, and even helped the
defense attorney by making the prosecutor appear more
argumentative.
3. Frequency of interruption or objection
In order to determine if the distinctiveness of the
interruption or objection mattered, I manipulated and
analyzed the effect of interruption and objection frequency.
Jurors rated the high frequency conditions as having more
interruptions or objections69 and being more annoying70 than
the low frequency conditions. Frequency did not influence
verdicts,71 attorney favorability,72 or memory for evidence.73
Again, the defense’s interruptions of the trial influenced
perceptions of the prosecutor, who was rated as more
aggressive in the high frequency conditions;74 however,

68. See supra Figure 4.
69. For defense attorneys: high frequency objections (M = 3.64, SD = 0.11)
were rated as more frequent than low frequency objections (M = 2.46, SD = 0.10),
F(1, 84) = 66.12, MSe = 0.46, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.44; high frequency interruptions
(M = 4.05, SD = 0.11) were rated as more frequent than low frequency
interruptions (M = 2.83, SD = 0.11), F(1, 83) = 65.31, MSe = 0.48, p < 0.001,
R2 = 0.44. Interestingly, the prosecuting attorney who never objected was also
rated as objecting significantly more in the high frequency defense objection
condition (M = 3.64, SD = 0.11) than the low frequency (M = 2.46, SD = 0.10),
F(1, 84) = 66.11, MSe = 0.46, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.44. This pattern did not occur in the
control or interruption conditions, suggesting jurors might have source confusion
and believe both attorneys are objecting.
70. Objections: F(1, 84) = 7.23 MSe = 3.16, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.08 (high frequency:
M = 4.17, SD = 0.27; low frequency: M = 3.14, SD = 0.27); interruptions: F(1,
82) = 42.24, MSe = 2.71, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.34 (high frequency: M = 6.02, SD = 0.25;
low frequency: M = 3.69, SD = 0.25).
71. See infra Table 2 for logistic regression results (not guilty verdicts—low
frequency: 66.3%; high frequency: 68.2%).
72. Prosecutor favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.08, MSe = 0.85, p = 0.78; defense
favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.16, MSe = 1.97, p = 0.69. See infra Figure 5.
73. Before evidence: F(1, 150) = 1.73, MSe = 0.79, p = 0.19 (percentage
correct—objection: 81.4%; interruption: 79.0%); after evidence: F(1, 150) = 1.30,
MSe = 0.63, p = 0.26 (percentage correct—objection: 73.0%; interruption: 70.2%).
74. F(1, 150) = 4.38, MSe = 1.99, p = 0.04.
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ratings of defense attorney (who did the interrupting)
aggressiveness were not different.75
FIGURE 5.

Attorney ratings based
frequency in Study 1.

on

interruption

Consequently, the hypothesis that more distinct
objections would be more influential was not supported—the
frequency of the interruptions or objections did not make a
difference. Jurors did find more interruptions to be more
annoying, but only the prosecuting attorney was rated as
more aggressive when he was interrupted more. There were
no differences in ratings of defense attorney aggressiveness.
It also should be noted that in the high frequency conditions,
there were fifteen interruptions or objections in the 45-

75. See infra Figure 5. F(1, 150) = 1.21, MSe = 2.01, p = 0.27.
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minute audio trial. Although this was rated as high on the
frequency scale for interruptions, for objections it was only
in the middle of the frequency scale. Therefore, it is possible
that jurors expect objections in the trial. Moreover, in the
high frequency objection condition both the defense attorney
and the prosecuting attorney (who never objected) were rated
as objecting more frequently than in the low frequency
objection condition, indicating there is some degree of juror
confusion about which party is objecting. Consequently, it is
possible that any negative effects of objecting could apply to
both sides, and not just the party objecting.
4. Attorney favorability
Although Study 1 did not support attorney concerns that
objections negatively impact jurors, results do emphasize
that perceptions of the attorney are an important factor. For
example, although interruption type and frequency had no
effect, attorney favorability76 was one of the primary factors
predicting differences in verdicts.77 Jurors who liked the
prosecutor were more likely to vote guilty, while jurors who
liked the defense attorney were more likely to vote not
guilty.78

76. Attorney favorability included jurors’ ratings of attorney competence,
trustworthiness,
qualifications,
professionalism,
likeability,
sincerity,
confidence, and confidence in having the attorney represent the juror. See supra
note 60 for a discussion of the specifics of calculating this variable and the
reliability.
77. See infra Table 2 for logistic regression (with interruption type and
frequency). Similar results occurred for interruption presence. See infra Table 1.
78. See infra Figure 6. For every one point increase in ratings of prosecuting
attorney favorability, jurors were 88% less likely to vote not guilty (Figure 6a);
for every one point increase in ratings of defense attorney favorability, jurors
were 6.77 times more likely to vote not guilty (Figure 6b). Note this was a
marginal main effect trending toward significant. See infra Table 2.
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Verdict based on attorney rating in Study 1.

B. Study 2: Objections and Attributions
The second study further investigated whether objection
frequency would influence mock jurors and whether the
effect would differ based on attorney gender. One-hundred
and fifty-two mock jurors79 listened to an audio trial that
varied in objection frequency and defense attorney gender.80

79. Mock jurors (Mage = 38, 48% female, 82% white) were recruited via
TurkPrime, randomly assigned to condition, and compensated with $6. See supra
note 56 for a review of TurkPrime. Participants who did not correctly identify the
gender of the attorneys or the defendant’s name (n = 32) were eliminated from
analyses.
80. Study 2 focused only on objections (not legally irrelevant interruptions)
and included high frequency, low frequency, and no objection conditions.
Therefore, the resulting study design was a 3 (objection frequency: none v.
frequent v. infrequent) x 2 (defense attorney gender: male v. female) betweensubjects experimental design, for 6 conditions.
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1. Objection frequency
As in Study 1, I manipulated the effect of objection
frequency. Jurors again rated the high frequency condition
as having more objections81 and being more annoying.82
Frequency again did not influence verdict,83 perceptions of
the attorneys (either favorability or aggressiveness),84 or
memory for evidence.85 Consequently, attorney fears about
objections were again unsupported in Study 2.
2. Attorney gender
In order to test the competing hypotheses about
expectations of objecting female attorneys,86 half of the
participants heard the trial with a male defense attorney and
half heard the trial with a female defense attorney in Study
2. Neither hypothesis was supported—attorney gender did
not interact with objection frequency to influence verdict,87

81. For defense attorneys: high frequency objections (M = 3.55, SD = 0.75)
were rated as most frequent followed by low frequent objections (M = 2.32,
SD = 0.67) then no objections (M = 1.21, SD = 0.56) (ps < 0.001), F(2,
117) = 53.13, MSe = 0.44, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.70. As in Study 1, the prosecuting
attorney who never objected was also rated as objecting significantly more in the
high frequency (M = 2.20, SD = 0.85) and low frequency (M = 2.03, SD = 0.69)
conditions than the no objection control (M = 1.21, SD = 0.56), F(2, 114) = 9.15,
MSe = 0.51, p < 0.01. Thus, even when only one attorney objects, jurors seem to
be remembering both attorneys objecting.
82. F(1, 73) = 12.16, p < 0.01 (high frequency: M = 4.63, SD = 0.31; low
frequency: M = 3.08, SD = 0.32).
83. See infra Table 3 for logistic regression results (not guilty verdicts—none:
65.1%; low frequency: 75.7%; high frequency: 60.0%).
84. Prosecutor favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.08, MSe = 0.85, p = 0.78 (none:
M = 5.26; low frequency: M = 5.08; high frequency: M = 5.11); defense
favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.16, MSe = 1.97, p = 0.69 (none: M = 5.34; low frequency
M = 5.20; high frequency M = 5.26).
85. Before evidence: F(2, 101) = 1.41, MSe = 0.77, p = 0.25; after evidence: F(2,
101) = 0.00, MSe = 0.99, p = 0.99.
86. I.e., female attorneys will be punished if objections are perceived as an
aggressive, masculine behavior, or rewarded if objections are perceived as a
client-focused, feminine behavior. See EAGLY, supra note 48, for a discussion of
gender role theory.
87. See infra Table 3 for logistic regression results.
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perceptions of the attorneys,88 or memory for evidence89 at
all. Therefore, objections by either male or female defense
attorneys did not negatively influence jurors. Moreover,
female attorneys were not penalized in general compared to
male attorneys, contrary to prior research.90
3. Attorney favorability
Study 2 also did not support attorney concerns that
objections negatively impact jurors, but the results further
emphasize the importance of jurors’ perceptions of the
attorney. Objection frequency and attorney gender did not
influence verdicts, but attorney favorability was again a
significant predictor of verdict.91 Jurors who liked the
prosecutor were significantly more likely to vote guilty, while
jurors who liked the defense attorney were significantly more
likely to vote not guilty.92

88. Prosecuting attorney favorability: F(2, 101) = 1.01, MSe = 1.19, p = 0.37;
defense attorney favorability: F(2, 101) = 1.40, MSe = 1.04, p = 0.25; prosecuting
attorney aggressiveness: F(2, 101) = 0.16, MSe = 1.70, p = 0.85; defense attorney
aggressiveness: F(2, 101) = 0.18, MSe = 2.42, p = 0.84.
89. Before evidence: F(2, 101) = 0.09, MSe = 0.77, p = 0.92; after evidence: F(2,
101) = 1.44, MSe = 0.99, p = 0.24.
90. See, e.g., Hahn & Clayton, supra note 37, at 533; Nelson, supra note 37,
at 177; Reed & Groscup, supra note 37.
91. See infra Table 3 for logistic regression.
92. See infra Figure 7. For every one-point increase in ratings of prosecuting
attorney favorability, jurors were 90% less likely to vote not guilty (Figure 7a);
for every one point increase in ratings of defense attorney favorability, jurors
were 6.74 times more likely to vote not guilty (Figure 7b). See infra Table 3.
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Verdict based on attorney rating in Study 2.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary and Caveats
The results of these two empirical studies demonstrate
that attorneys may have less to fear from objections than
scholars caution. General psychological research indicates
that objections might influence memory for evidence93 and
perceptions of attorneys,94 which are major components in
verdicts; however, psycholegal research had yet to test these
hypotheses.
The present studies represent the first attempt to
determine whether and how objections during trial influence
jurors similarly to interruptions in the real world. Neither
93. See supra Section I.B.1.
94. See supra Section I.B.2.
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Study 1 nor Study 2 supported the notion that objections
affect jurors’ memory for evidence or favorability ratings of
the attorneys. In fact, the only difference in perceptions of
the attorneys was that objections made the non-objecting
prosecutor appear more aggressive.95 Thus, objections did not
negatively influence jurors, and if anything, had positive
effects for the objecting attorney.
Moreover, the present studies did not support the gender
differences found in previous research.96 Although this
finding is promising, it might be due to the way gender was
manipulated. Previous research has used either written
materials with pictures or video materials; the present
studies used audio trials without pictures.97 Moreover, both
the male and female defense attorneys read the same script,
even though in real life speaking patterns of men and women
frequently differ. Therefore, it is possible that any gender
differences in judgments of the attorneys is not due directly
to the gender, but to other associated characteristics that
were held constant in this study, such as attractiveness,
gender conformity, speech style, or mannerisms.
Despite these findings, several caveats and limitations of
this research must be mentioned. First, I designed this study
to separate our understanding of the influence of objections
from the influence of inadmissible evidence, but in reality,
this is likely an artificial separation. In order to isolate
objections, this study held all evidence constant without
manipulating what was admitted. More research should be
95. The importance of this is twofold. First, the prosecutor was not the one
objecting and there were no differences in ratings of the objecting attorney.
Second, aggressiveness is a negative behavior generally (but might not be
perceived as negatively in a legal context). Nevertheless, attorney aggressiveness
did not predict verdict in any of the models. See infra Tables 1–3. Only attorney
favorability mattered, which was unaffected by objections.
96. See EAGLY, supra note 48.
97. This was done intentionally so as not to create a confound with attorney
characteristics, such as attractiveness, professionalism, or hand gestures. Jurors
were able to make gender determinations based off audio alone, and only jurors
who correctly identified attorney gender were included in the analyses.
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done to parse out how objections and inadmissible evidence
jointly and separately influence jurors.98 It would be
particularly interesting to determine if the type of evidence
objected to influences jurors, with the expectation that
objections could draw more attention to particularly distinct
(e.g., interesting, relevant, damaging) evidence.
Second, future research should further investigate the
influence of objection frequency in relation to juror
expectations. In these studies, jurors did rate the high
frequency conditions as higher in frequency than the low
frequency conditions (indicating a successful manipulation);
however, the high frequency objections were only rated at
roughly the midpoint of the scale. High frequency
interruptions were rated as occurring more frequently,
despite occurring at the same rate. Therefore, it is possible
jurors are expecting objections during trial, so it will take
more objections to be considered high frequency. It is possible
that extremely high frequency objections (e.g., objections
after nearly every question) could be more annoying or result
in more negative attributions and have the negative
consequences attorneys fear.
Third, this study isolated defense attorney objections,
but jurors believed that both sides objected. Moreover, the
non-objecting attorney was rated as more aggressive. In a
real trial, both sides can object. Therefore, future research
should assess what happens when both sides object. Does it
balance perceptions out, or do jurors have variable
expectations based on the side the attorney is representing?
Finally, research needs to assess the influence of judicial
rulings. Here, the balance of judicial rulings was held
constant (66% overruled); however, it is possible to have
rulings completely in support of one side. In actual trials,
jurors are usually instructed that the judge’s rulings should

98. For example, Wilson, supra note 15, at 3–4 found that including an
objection drew more attention to inadmissible evidence than when the evidence
was excluded at the end of the trial without an objection.
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not be interpreted as support for one side over the other, but
as with limiting instructions, jurors might not be able to
follow this instruction. Is the jury more likely to agree with
a side if the judicial rulings appear to completely support it
(particularly if the judge’s tone or actual words indicate
frustration with the other either for continually objecting or
attempting to present evidence that is being objected to)?
B. Should Attorneys Object?
Imagine again that you are a criminal defense attorney
and the prosecuting attorney brings up evidence of your
client’s prior criminal record in violation of the jurisdiction’s
rules of evidence—do you object? In making this immediate
decision, you probably quickly weigh the costs and benefits.
On the one hand, there are a number of benefits to timely
objections, including preventing the jury from hearing the
evidence, preserving the record, and getting another
opportunity to persuade the jury.99 On the other hand, there
are several feared consequences of legal folklore; however,
these fears are not empirically supported. In fact, the results
of the two studies presented in this Article demonstrate
either no effect or a somewhat positive effect of objecting.
More research is necessary to investigate more nuanced
situations, but in general, the objection alone is not
negatively influencing jurors. Therefore, your decision
probably should weigh in favor of objecting.
Another consideration in favor of objecting is that in
some instances, objections might actually be required.
Attorneys have certain duties to their clients, including
zealous representation100 and competency,101 which might
99. See supra Section I.A for a discussion of the benefits.
100. Rules may vary by jurisdiction, but most have adopted a version of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which imposes a duty for attorneys to act
zealously in representation of their clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
Preamble ¶ 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
101. “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
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include objecting at trial. Although objections are not
specified as required in most instances,102 under tort law, a
lawyer may be sued for malpractice if they breach one of the
duties and it causes damage to his or her client. In terms of
professional conduct, attorneys might breach the duty of
competency if they do not object when a reasonable attorney
would have.103
It must also be noted that although concerns about
objections have not been empirically supported, concerns
about jurors being unable to disregard inadmissible evidence
have been supported. Thus, objections should be made early,
not just in order to be considered timely, but also to
preemptively stop the jury from hearing the evidence if
possible. Courts104 and researchers105 alike have found that
the use of limiting instructions to cure the prejudicial impact
of inadmissible evidence is often ineffective. Some
researchers have even found that strong limiting
instructions can backfire and increase the prejudicial impact
of the evidence.106 Therefore, attorneys should do everything
possible, including early objections, to prevent the jury from
hearing the questionable evidence.

reasonably necessary for the representation.” See id. at r. 1.1. Objecting at the
proper time could be considered to be part of the required knowledge and skill.
102. One exception, in some jurisdictions, is that attorneys might explicitly be
required to raise reasonable objections to prevent another party from obtaining
confidential information. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 63 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
103. Although these cases might be difficult because of challenges proving
either cause and/or damage (i.e., a client might have to demonstrate they would
have been successful but-for the attorney’s failure to object), the Seventh Circuit
has found ineffective counsel for an attorney’s failure to object to unduly
suggestive identifications. Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2000).
104. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
105. See, e.g., Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 19.
106. See, e.g., Cox & Tanford, supra note 19, at 31; Kramer et al., supra note
19, at 430; Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 19, at 206–09.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The results of these studies indicate that, when in doubt,
in most instances attorneys should favor objecting over
sitting quietly. It is better to err on the side of preventing
evidence from being admitted or preserving the record than
to fear jury alienation. But legal lore is difficult to overcome
even with empirical evidence. Therefore, if you still fear that
objecting will alienate the jury (despite lack of empirical
support), you should, at least, attempt to object pre-trial.
Although juror perceptions of the attorneys are important,
evidence is the driving factor behind verdict. It is important
to prevent juries from hearing prejudicial, inadmissible
evidence, particularly because they struggle with
disregarding such evidence after they have heard it.
Therefore, if you do not want to object during trial and you
predict that the other side might attempt to admit
inadmissible, prejudicial evidence, file a motion in limine to
attempt to block such evidence ahead of trial; and if that does
not work (or you cannot predict what will be brought up)—
object!
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION TABLES
TABLE 1.

Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for
Verdict based on Interruption and Sample.
Summary of Results (N = 208)

Variable
Step 1
Interruption
Audience
Constant

B

S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B)

0.27 0.37
0.49 0.30
-0.29

0.56
2.79

1 0.46
1 0.10

1.31
1.64

3.20 1.19
2.18 0.76
-2.09 0.83
-2.62

7.29
8.24
6.36

1 0.07
1 0.04
1 0.01

24.62
8.82
0.12

Step 2
Interruption
Audience
Interruption x Audience
Constant

Note: Step 1: Goodness of Fit X2 (2) = 3.50, p = 0.12; -2 Log
likelihood = 263.54; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.02; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.02.
Step 2: Goodness of Fit X2(3) = 10.78, p = 0.01; -2 Log
likelihood = 256.26; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.05; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.07.

2019]

CALLS FOR SPECULATION

TABLE 2.
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Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for
Verdict based on Interruption Type, Frequency,
and Audience.
Summary of Results (N = 166)

Variable
Step 1
Interruption Type
Interruption Frequency
Audience
Constant

B

S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B)

-0.13 0.33
0.09 0.33
0.02 0.33
0.75

0.15 1
0.08 1
0.00 1

0.70
0.78
0.96

0.88
1.10
1.02

0.16
0.69
-1.26
-0.72
0.51
0.32
1.08

1.49
1.50
1.39
.66
0.66
0.66

0.01
0.21
0.82
1.18
0.60
0.23

1
1
1
1
1
1

0.92
0.64
0.37
0.28
0.44
0.63

1.17
2.00
0.29
0.49
1.67
1.38

3.35
3.95
1.82
-2.86
-1.54
-1.77
1.38
-3.71

3.44
3.52
3.28
2.19
2.09
2.14
1.34

0.95
1.26
0.31
1.71
0.54
0.69
1.06

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.33
0.26
0.58
0.19
0.46
0.41
0.30

28.50
51.87
6.15
0.06
0.22
0.17
3.99

3.92
5.46
2.24
-3.50
-1.51
-2.12
1.39
-2.16
1.89
-3.86

4.30 .83 1
4.59 1.42 1
4.20 0.28 1
2.80 1.56 1
2.64 0.33 1
2.81 0.57 1
1.73 0.65 1
0.38 31.49 1
0.35 29.61 1

Step 2
Interruption Type
Interruption Frequency
Audience
Type x Frequency
Type x Audience
Frequency x Audience
Constant

Step 3
Interruption Type
Interruption Frequency
Audience
Type x Frequency
Type x Audience
Frequency x Audience
Type x Frequency x Audience
Constant

Step 4
Interruption Type
Interruption Frequency
Audience
Type x Frequency
Type x Audience
Frequency x Audience
Type x Frequency x Audience
Prosecutor Favorability
Defense Favorability
Constant

0.36 50.17
0.23 234.07
0.59
9.37
0.21
0.03
0.57
0.22
0.45
0.12
0.42
4.03
0.00
0.17
0.00
6.60

86

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

TABLE 2.

[Vol. 67

(Continued) Summary of Logistic Regression
Analysis for Verdict based on Interruption
Type, Frequency, and Audience.
Summary of Results (N = 166)

Variable
Step 5
Interruption Type
Interruption Frequency
Audience
Type x Frequency
Type x Audience
Frequency x Audience
Type x Frequency x Audience
Prosecutor Favorability
Defense Favorability
Prosecutor Aggressiveness
Defense Aggressiveness
Constant

B
3.81
5.21
1.86
-3.45
-1.45
-1.97
1.39
-2.14
1.91
0.17
-0.20
-3.39

S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B)
4.35 0.77 1
4.2 1.27 1
4.27 0.19 1
2.82 1.50 1
2.68 0.29 1
2.83 0.48 1
1.75 0.63 1
0.39 30.46 1
0.35 29.75 1
0.21 0.67 1
0.22 0.85 1

0.38 45.15
0.26 183.02
0.66
6.44
0.22
0.03
0.59
0.23
0.49
0.14
0.43
4.00
0.00
0.12
0.00
6.77
0.41
1.18
0.36
0.82

Note: Step 1: Goodness of Fit X2 (3) = 0.23, p = 0.97; -2 Log
likelihood = 216.05; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.00; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.00. Step
2: Goodness of Fit X2(6) = 2.46, p = 0.87; -2 Log likelihood = 213.82; Cox
& Snell R2 = 0.02; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.02. Step 3: Goodness of Fit
X2(7) = 3.53, p = 0.83; -2 Log likelihood = 212.74; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.02;
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.03. Step 4: Goodness of Fit X2(9) = 75.96, p < 0.001;
-2 Log likelihood = 140.32; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.36; Nagelkerke
R2 = 0.50. Step 5: Goodness of Fit X2(11) = 79.91, p < 0.001; -2 Log
likelihood = 212.74; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.02; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.03
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TABLE 3.
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Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for
Verdict based on Objection Frequency and
Defense Attorney Gender.
Summary of Results (N = 166)

Variable
Step 1
Objection Frequency
Defense Gender
Constant

B

S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B)

-0.12 0.23
0.36 0.39
0.64

0.26
0.86

1 0.61
1 0.35

0.89
1.44

Objection Frequency
-0.05 0.31
Defense Gender
0.53 0.62
Frequency x Defense Gender -0.17 0.47
Constant
0.57

0.02
0.73
0.12

1 0.88
1 0.39
1 0.73

0.95
1.70
0.85

Step 2

Step 3
Objection Frequency
-0.02
Defense Gender
1.07
Frequency x Defense Gender -0.75
Prosecutor Favorability
-2.31
Defense Favorability
1.88
Constant
3.06

0.40 0.00 1
0.81 1.75 1
0.67 1.30 1
0.48 23.24 1
0.45 17.90 1

0.96
0.19
0.26
0.00
0.00

0.98
2.92
0.47
0.10
6.57

0.42 0.01 1 .93
0.81 1.47 1 .23
0.67 1.07 1 .30
0.50 22.15 1 0.00
0.45 18.18 1 0.00
0.28 0.84 1 0.36
0.23 0.11 1 0.74

1.04
2.66
0.50
0.10
6.74
0.78
1.08

Step 4
Objection Frequency
0.04
Defense Gender
0.98
Frequency x Defense Gender -0.69
Prosecutor Favorability
-2.33
Defense Favorability
1.91
Prosecutor Aggressiveness -0.25
Defense Aggressiveness
0.08
Constant
3.59

Note: Step 1: Goodness of Fit X2 (2) = 1.08, p = 0.58; -2 Log
likelihood = 151.68; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.01; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.01. Step
2: Goodness of Fit X2(3) = 1.21, p = 0.75; -2 Log likelihood = 151.56;
Cox & Snell R2 = 0.01; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.01. Step 3: Goodness of Fit
X2(5) = 60.07, p < 0.001; -2 Log likelihood = 92.70; Cox & Snell
R2 = 0.39; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.55. Step 4: Goodness of Fit X2(7) = 61.00,
p < 0.001; -2 Log likelihood = 91.76; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.40;
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.55.

